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Introduction 
This paper assesses indications that Russia might attempt to cultivate separatist sentiments in 
Ajara as a means of putting pressure on the Georgian government. Ajaran autonomy within 
Georgia is internationally recognized, although the extent of its self-rule was greatly scaled back 
after the 2003 Rose Revolution led local despot Aslan Abashidze to flee to Moscow. There are 
indicators that Russia might be attempting to support an Abashidze-led resistance to Tbilisi in 
Ajara. While the stronger sense of Georgian identity in the region and the potential for adversely 
involving Turkey are impediments to Russia achieving an Abkhazian or South Ossetian-style 
secession in Ajara, such an initiative would enable Russia to further erode Georgian sovereignty 
and fracture its territorial integrity.  
In the wake of its August 2008 conflict with Georgia, Moscow may be reviewing the potential for 
establishing a separatist regime in the Black Sea coastal region of Ajara. The recent conflict saw 
Moscow drastically alter a status quo in the South Caucasus that had existed for the previous 
fifteen years, imposing by force a resolution on the major issues in dispute between itself and 
Georgia, and unilaterally recognizing the independence of the Abkhazian and South Ossetian 
regions. However, in doing so it removed major elements previously at its disposal for pressuring 
the Georgian government, other than a renewal of military conflict and the occupation of territory 
universally recognized as Georgian. It is reasonable to assume that the Russian government is 
examining new initiatives by which it can pressure Georgia.  
Russia’s South Caucasus policy has been focused for the last few years on Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia. By supporting but not recognizing the independence of their governments, Moscow was 
able to modulate Georgian behavior by playing on its desire for a restoration of national integrity. 
With these two regions now “independent” and South Ossetia at least far on the path toward 
annexation, Russia’s new interests in the South Caucasus may have outrun its policy 
preparations and on-the-ground capabilities. If this is indeed the case, Russia will be raising an 
entirely new set of issues for dealing with the Georgian government.  
To be sure, Russia has effectively limitless pretexts available should it choose to reopen armed 
hostilities. For example, it might allege that continuing unrest in the North Caucasus (Dagestan, 
Ingushetiya, and of course Chechnya) is the result of Georgian operatives infiltrating from the 
Pankisi Gorge, or that Georgia is violating the terms of the EU-brokered ceasefire. An even more 
ominous course was hinted at recently with the publication of police alerts alleging a Georgian 
program to unleash a wave of terror bombings across Russia.[1] Russia demonstrated in the 
recent conflict that it has the ability to move its forces across Georgia virtually at will. But its near 
complete failure to muster international support for its actions implies that it will be looking for a 
set of options more effective than its on-going economic blockade yet more indirect than force. 
One means of doing this is to continue the policy previously carried out in Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia—encourage separatist sentiment in Georgia’s peripheral regions, with an eye to further 
fracturing the country.  
This paper assesses indications that Russia might attempt to cultivate separatist sentiments in 
the Georgian region of Ajara with just such a policy in mind. Properly conducted, such an initiative 
might enable Russia to erode Georgian sovereignty still further and fracture its territorial integrity 
by more subtle means than the use or threat of naked force. Ajara is in some ways an ideal 
candidate for such a policy, as it is an autonomous republic within Georgia, and until recently was 
ruled by a local despot with little interference from the national government in Tbilisi. By contrast, 
an attempt to organize a separatist movement among, for example, the majority ethnic Armenians 
in Javakheti district or the ethnic Azeris who comprise a significant portion of the population in 
rural eastern Georgia, would find no autonomous administrative structures in place and no 
tradition of local self-rule. 
Ajara—Another Potential Georgian Break-Away Region?  
Ajara is located in the southwestern corner of Georgia, bordering Turkey to the south and fronting 
the Black Sea to the west. Its major city is the port and resort of Batumi. In addition it contains the 
border crossing point of Sarpi and five rural districts. According to the 2002 census its population 
was 376,016 out of a total Georgian population of 4.3 million.[2] A small amount of crude is sent 
by rail from Baku in neighboring Azerbaijan to Batumi for refining and export by tanker. Batumi is 
also connected by road and rail to Tbilisi. Ajarans are overwhelmingly ethnic Georgian, speaking 
a cluster of closely related dialects.[3]  
Ajara’s unique status within Georgia derives from its back-and-forth history under first Ottoman 
and then Russian rule. As a result of protracted Ottoman occupation, well over half the population 
of this region had converted to Islam by the mid-nineteenth century. In 1878 Ajara (then including 
territory now in Turkey and in many places still inhabited by ethnic Georgians) was annexed by 
the Russian Empire. As a result, the Christian element in the population began to increase, 
primarily because of migration of Orthodox Georgians from areas that had never been under 
Ottoman rule. In Article 6 of the 1923 Treaty of Kars, Georgia pledged to respect Ajara’s 
autonomous status: 
Turkey agrees to cede to Georgia suzerainty over the town and port of Batum, with the territory to 
the north of the frontier, indicated in Article IV of the present Treaty, which formed part of the 
district of Batum, on condition:  
1. That the population of the localities specified in the present Article shall enjoy a greater 
measure of local administrative autonomy, that each community is guaranteed its cultural 
and religious rights, and that this population may introduce in the above-mentioned 
places an agrarian system in conformity with its own wishes.  
2. That Turkey be assured free transit through the port of Batum for commodities and all 
materials destined for, or originating in, Turkey, without customs duties and charges, and 
with the right for Turkey to utilize the port of Batum without special charges. For the 
application of this Article, a commission of representatives of the interested Parties shall 
be created immediately after the signing of the present Treaty.  
The Treaty of Kars was signed by Turkey and by three components of the new Soviet Union, the 
Soviet Socialist Republic of Armenia, the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic, and the Soviet 
Socialist Republic of Georgia, after negotiations to which the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist 
Republic was also a party. During the Soviet period the treaty was a dead letter: religion, whether 
Islam or Christianity, was persecuted; “autonomy” was little more than a matter of local 
nomenclature; all agriculture was collectivized according to Stalinist principles, and Turkish 
access to the port of Batumi was non-existent. Following the Second World War, Soviet leader 
Joseph Stalin even revived claims to the territories ceded to Turkey in the Treaty of Kars, 
although this was rescinded by his successors.  
However, in the 1990s local conditions more-or-less returned to the status they held in the early 
1920s, facilitating recognition of the treaty as the basis of the border and legal regimes in the 
South Caucasus. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union it has been vigorously upheld by Turkey, 
not least because of the recognition it gives to Turkish interests in the internal affairs of its three 
South Caucasian neighbors. Post-Soviet Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan also recognize its 
validity as the legal foundation of interstate relations in the South Caucasus region, although 
Armenia has complained that Turkey itself has failed fully to honor the treaty’s terms and 
conditions.[4] Because of the Treaty of Kars, Ajara entered the post-Soviet period with a 
functioning regional government that included a Supreme Council, ministries with established 
jurisdiction and functions, and local services. Given that the key difference between Ajarans and 
other Georgians was the greater prevalence of Islam in the population rather than language or 
ethnicity, autonomous status would probably not have been granted to Ajara during the 
Communist period without the preexisting commitment to Turkey.  
During the “perestroika” years of the late 1980s, Aslan Abashidze was able to rise to local 
prominence. Abashidze was a grandson of the Georgian Muslim leader Murad Abashidze, who 
led Ajara during Georgia’s previous brief period of independence, during the Russian Civil War 
(1918-1921). The scion of a princely family that claimed to have ruled Ajara since the fifteenth 
century, Murad Abashidze was shot by Stalin’s order in 1937.[5] While his ancestry meant that 
Aslan Abashidze had a difficult time during the Soviet years, he was able to leverage it into 
appointment as Chairman of the Supreme Council of the Autonomous Republic of Ajaria and 
Deputy Chairman of the Georgian Parliament in 1991, as the Soviet Union began to disintegrate. 
During Georgia’s rocky transition out of Soviet Communism—it fought a civil war in 1991-93 
during which the autonomous republics of Abkazhia and South Ossetia mounted successful 
Russian-backed secessionist revolts—Abashidze focused his attention on establishing his power 
base within Ajara.  
Abashidze’s regime was noted for corruption and for facilitating smuggling and trafficking of all 
sorts across the Turkish border and through the port of Batumi. He discouraged other industries, 
especially tourism, for which Batumi had been noted in the Soviet period.[6] Tax revenues were 
not forwarded to the national government but remained in Ajara at his disposal. His control over 
his fiefdom was ironclad, exercised through both the Ajaran Ministry of the Interior and his 
personal militia, which for appearances’ sake was termed the 25th Brigade of the Georgian 
Defense Ministry. Moreover, a Russian army base just outside of Batumi was always a potential 
instrument of intervention, should Moscow choose to interfere in Ajari affairs. He had strong 
backing from Moscow, and both Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev and Moscow Mayor 
Yuri Luzhkov visited Batumi, but not Tbilisi.  
During his thirteen year rule, Abashidze never won an election with less than ninety percent of the 
vote.[7] In 1998 he had himself elected “President of Ajaria” and his son Giorgi mayor of Batumi 
in elections from which international and Georgian monitors were barred, but which Russian 
observers declared to be free and fair.[8] Abashidze’s grip on the electorate meant that his 
Democratic Revival party controlled—at a minimum—ten percent of the total Georgian vote, 
which made it one of the largest factions in the fractured parliament. Between 1993 and 2004 he 
did not leave Ajara except for trips to Moscow, alleging that the central Georgian government in 
Tbilisi was trying to have him assassinated. This charge reflects his complicated relations with 
Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze’s administration—he supported it when it came to 
power at the end of the civil war, then opposed it for a decade, and again supported it when 
Shevardnadze unsuccessfully confronted the populist “Rose Revolution” of 2003.  
Abashidze played a direct role in provoking the Rose Revolution. In the November 2, 2003 
parliamentary elections, he pressed hard by all means at his disposal for his Democratic Revival 
party to gain a plurality of the votes, then went into coalition with President Shevardnadze’s For a 
New Georgia party in return for national recognition of the enhanced powers he had awarded 
himself as President of Ajaria. International and Georgian election observers denounced the 
voting as fraudulent, and opposition leader Mikheil Saakashvili claimed that an independent audit 
of the polling showed his coalition had actually won the election. Weeks of demonstration marred 
by violence culminated when Shevardnadze attempted to convene the newly elected parliament. 
Supporters of the reform coalition burst into the chamber carrying roses, and in the ensuing 
chaos Shevardnadze was forced to flee. He declared a state of national emergency but key 
police and military leaders refused to support him. Shevardnadze resigned the presidency at a 
November 23 meeting with the opposition brokered by Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov. On 
January 4, 2004 Saakashvili was elected president, and in new parliamentary elections on March 
28 his party, the National Movement-Democrats, won a strong majority.[9]  
During the Rose Revolution Abashidze sent counter-demonstrators to Tbilisi to back the 
Shevardnadze regime, but after Saakashvili’s election he had to deal with rising levels of unrest 
by pro-democracy activists in Batumi and elsewhere in Ajara. Abashidze declared a state of 
emergency in Ajara immediately after Shevardnadze’s resignation and used Ajarian Interior 
Ministry forces to raid and harass the opposition and attack demonstrators. On March 14, newly-
elected President Saskashvili took advantage of Abashidze’s absence in Moscow to attempt to 
enter Ajara and support his party’s parliamentary candidates. He was stopped at the border by 
Ajaran Ministry of Interior forces. On his return to Tbilisi, Saakashvili announced an economic 
blockade of Ajara until Abashidze disbanded the region’s Interior Ministry, allowed free 
campaigning, and gave up his control over local tax revenues.  
Tensions continued to heighten, and on April 19 and 21, 2004, Batumi-based military 
commanders Roman Dumbadze and Murad Tsintsadze announced that they were loyal only to 
the “Supreme Commander-in-Chief of Ajaria” Abashidze, perhaps signaling preparations for a 
unilateral declaration of independence. "I do not recognize the charges voiced by president 
Mikhail Saakashvili against me, and from today do not obey the [Georgian] Supreme 
Commander-in-Chief. According to Adjaria’s Constitution, Aslan Abashidze is the Supreme 
Commander-in-Chief, and I together with 547 servicemen of the 25th brigade come under 
Abashidze’s command,” was Major General Dumbadze’s unequivocal statement at the time.[10] 
At the end of April 2004, Abashidze ordered the demolition of the two bridges over the Choloki 
river that comprises the administrative border of Ajara. Abashidze’s control over events 
nonetheless continued to weaken. After a meeting with Russian Security Council Secretary 
Sergei Ivanov on May 5, 2004 in which Abashidze vainly appealed for support, he accepted a 
Russian offer of asylum and fled with his family and entourage to Moscow.[11]  
The Saakashvili government’s ouster of Abashidze and reintegration of Ajara into the Georgian 
polity was handled deftly enough that both Georgian and outside observers thought, prior to the 
2008 Russian intervention, that it might serve as a model for eventual Abkhazian and South 
Ossetian reunion.[12] Cross-border trafficking was scaled back and the delicate issue of religious 
identity and rights created no unusual turmoil. The Georgian government tried hard to walk the 
delicate line between respecting Ajara’s special status and integrating the region back into the 
Georgian political and economic spheres.  
For example, on July 5, 2007, the seat of the Georgian Constitutional Court was moved from 
Tbilisi to Batumi.[13] A sizable program of public works and of promoting the tourist trade and 
resettling long-term refugees from Abkhazia has created much visible prosperity, especially in 
Batumi, and minimized any lingering sympathy among the population at large for the departed 
Abashidze family. However, it is inevitable in any power transition that discontented individuals 
and interests will look back to the previous regime with nostalgia. Ajarians prone to such nostalgia 
were reminded of the dark side of Abashidze’s rule when in January 2007 he was sentenced in 
absentia to fifteen years in prison, for embezzlement and abuse of office. He has also been 
indicted for complicity in the murder of Nodar Imnadze, his former deputy, during the Civil War in 
1991.[14] (By contrast, former President Eduard Shevardnadze has not been charged with any 
crimes, and lives in semi-retirement in Tbilisi, occasionally making statements on national issues 
for the Georgian press.) 
Weighing the Potential for Russian Intervention in Ajara  
On August 28, 2008, following its short war with Georgia, Russia demanded that former Georgian 
Major General Roman Dumbadze be exchanged for twelve Georgian soldiers seized during its 
sack of the port of Poti.[15]  Dumbadze had been commander of the Batumi-based 25th brigade 
of the Georgian Interior Ministry (nominally subordinated to the Georgian Defense Ministry but 
actually administered by the Ajari Interior Ministry) when Aslan Abashidze had his standoff with 
Saakashvili. He fell into Georgian hands when Abashidze fled to Moscow. Dumbadze was 
arrested by the Georgian authorities and sentenced to 17 years in prison for treason and 
mutiny.[16] With both Abashidze and Dumbadze in Moscow, the Russian government has the 
nucleus of an Ajaran government-in-exile, should it chose to put additional pressure on Tbilisi.   
Successful Ajaran separatism would be a devastating blow to Georgia, as the Russian 
newspaper Kommersant noted on August 29.[17] It would lose one of its two remaining seaports, 
and its most important land border crossing into Turkey at Sarpi. Russia would have again 
demonstrated its ability to punish South Caucasus adversaries by means other than brute military 
force, with a chilling effect on not only the Tbilisi government but also on Azerbaijan and, other 
governments of former Soviet republics. However, Russia must overcome significant 
impediments if it is to execute such a policy successfully.  
The first—and most important—is that Ajarans are ethnically Georgian. Ajarans seem to view 
themselves as Georgians rather than a separate people, and shared in the post-Soviet burst of 
Georgian patriotism. The region received its special status nearly a century ago because of its 
Muslim majority. However, while both Islam and Orthodoxy have seen an increase the number of 
their practicing members since the fall of Communism, the identity of the Georgian Orthodox 
Church with the Georgian nation since independence from the Soviet Union has led to Muslims 
becoming a minority in Ajara for the first time since the Ottoman conquest.[18] The 2002 
census—conducted under Abashidze, himself a Muslim -- found that of Ajara’s population of 376 
thousand, 240,552 were Orthodox and 115,161 were Muslim. Moreover, the respectful manner in 
which Georgia has handled Ajaran autonomy since the flight of Abashidze means there is likely to 
be little popular support for, and much opposition to, any attempt to set up a separatist movement. 
Lingering popular sentiment favoring the rule of the Abashidze princely house would seem to be 
the only local source of support for a Russian-backed Ajari government-in-exile.  
As noted earlier, one element that influenced the situation in Ajara in Russia’s favor was its 
possession of a former Soviet military base outside of Batumi, the 12th Military Base, formerly 
home of the 145th Motorized Rifle Division, and one of four such bases in Georgia. These 
facilities became foci of Russian influence in the country, not least because they were islands of 
stability during the Georgian civil war and then centers of employment in the impoverished years 
that followed. From the moment of independence, various Georgian governments demanded that 
Russia withdraw from these bases, but a framework for withdrawal was not developed until the 
parties to the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty adapted it to post-Soviet 
conditions in Europe. Negotiations to this effect were completed at the November 1999 Summit of 
the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. (It should be noted that while Russia 
ratified Adapted CFE, the NATO parties agreed not to proceed with the ratification process until 
Russian lived up to Adapted CFE provisions. In 2007 Russia formally withdrew from the treaty.) 
Article 1 Paragraph 3, of the Adapted CFE Treaty reads: 
Conventional armaments and equipment of a State Party in the categories limited by the Treaty 
shall only be present on the territory of another State Party in conformity with international law, 
the explicit consent of the host State Party, or a relevant resolution of the United Nations Security 
Council. Explicit consent must be provided in advance, and must continue to be in effect as 
provided for in Article XIII, paragraph 1 bis.[19] 
Annex 14 of the accord is a Joint Statement of the Russian Federation and Georgia, in which 
Russia agreed to pull out of its bases at Vaziani and Gudauta by July 1, 2001 and to complete 
arrangements for a withdrawal from Batumi and Akhalkalaki in the year 2000. However, 
negotiations for withdrawal from the latter two dragged on until March 31, 2006, when Russia 
agreed to a pullout by the end of 2008.[20] Russia actually completed its withdrawal early, pulling 
out from the 12th Military Base in Batumi on November 13, 2007.[21] It would seem then that, at 
least from the perspective of military capabilities immediately at hand, the time for Russian 
intervention in Ajara has passed.  
A final obstacle to any Russian attempt to promote a secessionist regime in Ajara that should not 
be overlooked is the potential that this move would hold for alienating Turkey. There is a 
complicated mix of elements in Turkish relations with Georgia, as there are in Turkey’s relations 
with Moscow. Turkey has had good relations with Georgia, and is its partner in the Baku-Tbilisi-
Ceyhan pipeline, launched in the 1990s as a means of transporting Caspian energy resources to 
the world market without their having to traverse Russian or Iranian territory. Turkish truckers are 
ubiquitous on Georgian highways, following another circuitous route that allows them to avoid 
Armenia in carrying goods to and from Azerbaijan and points east. There are several hundred 
thousand Georgian economic migrants in Turkey, and Turkey support was crucial to Georgia in 
surviving the early stages of Russian’s economic blockade, launched in 2005.  
On the other hand, Turkey has in recent years been drifting toward a more pro-Russian stance, 
as its relations with its traditional allies in Europe and the United States have become more 
strained. While there is no tradition of warm ties between Moscow and Ankara, not all voices 
within Turkey are pro-Georgian. The sizable Abkhazian diaspora has been loud in its attacks on 
Tbilisi, and there are signs that the Turkish government is taking an interest in the Meshkhetian 
and Azeri Turkic minorities in Georgia.[22] As previously mentioned, the Treaty of Kars 
recognizes a legitimate Turkish interest in the autonomy of Ajara. Russian establishment of a 
puppet regime directly on the Turkish border, or even a serious effort to destabilize Ajara, could 
well tip Ankara into direct support of Georgia. Turkey’s size, relative wealth, geographic siting, 
and Western-style military give it the capability to support South and even North Caucasian 
resistance to Russia, or even intervene on its own behalf. Moscow would probably weigh this 
possibility heavily in reviewing its Ajara options, especially since the advantages it would gain in 
spitting Turkey from its Western allies far outweigh any satisfaction it might obtain from further 
humiliating a small neighbor with barely five million inhabitants.  
Conclusion  
In reviewing the factors that might support or hinder Russian encouragement of a separatist 
movement in Ajara, two stand out as favoring the success of such a move—the existence of a 
recognized regional government, and a recent tradition of local self-rule. By contrast, there are a 
number of significant differences between the situation in Ajara and that in Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia. The first is the Georgian ethnicity of Ajara, and the tendency of the population to stress 
their national rather than their local identity. A second is that Ajara has no border with Russia and 
Russia has closed the military base it had in the region. There is no boiling discontent in Ajara, 
and while Russia could work to aggravate tensions this would take time and could well be 
unsuccessful in any event. Finally, Russia must consider the potential impact a Russian-
orchestrated secession movement on its relations with Turkey, which is situated to make Russia’s 
own position in the Caucasus very uncomfortable, should it become hostile.  
It is nonetheless possible that by reuniting the Abashidze-Dumbadze team Moscow intends to set 
up an Ajaran political opposition or even government-in-exile. This move would undoubtedly 
unsettle Tbilisi and perhaps even affect national political dynamics as Saakashvili attempts to 
retain the Presidency in the wake of the August ’08 debacle. However, this step alone is unlikely 
to be met with any enthusiasm in Ajara, even among that element of the population with residual 
affection for its native Muslim dynasty. To instate an Abashidze-led separatist regime, Moscow 
would have to install it by force, or else wait for a renewal of political turmoil in Georgia to create 
an opportune moment for its return. While Ajara does not border Russia, the August 2008 conflict 
demonstrated that Russian forces can intervene at will anywhere on the territory of the Georgian 
Republic. Thus, Russia could conceivably impose a restored Abashidze regime in Ajara by force 
if it was willing to reinforce the reputation it has acquired for unilateral and violent behavior in the 
Caucasus region, and accept additional local and international criticism. Such a move would 
punish Georgia for its alignment with the West, and might even bring a more tractable regime to 
power in Tbilisi, but at the price Russia at present seems unwilling to pay.  
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